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I. INTRODUCTION
SSUES relating to tax deferral and time value of money are probably
the most important areas of tax study for several reasons.' First, they
cut across all areas of tax law, whether one is focusing on individual
income tax, international tax, corporate tax, partnership tax, or any other
area. Second, they are the keys to understanding how to properly tax
financial instruments, including derivatives.2 Finally, tax deferral and
time value of money issues are important in understanding the differ-
ences among the numerous flat tax and consumption tax proposals that
have been introduced in the United States the last few years.3
My research has led me to conclude that the key to understanding tax
deferral and corresponding time value of money issues is to have a thor-
ough understanding of the Cary Brown model, sometimes called the MIT
model. This model was discovered by Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy economics professor E. Cary Brown and was published by him in
1948 as a chapter in a small book.4 The model generally holds that imme-
diately deducting the cost of an asset is equivalent to excluding from
1. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, The Achilles' Heel of the Comprehensive Income
Tax, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980s 278, 280 (Charles E.
Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield eds., 1983) ("Deferral of gain is not as serious as outright
exemption, but it is the next best thing, as sophisticated taxpayers and their counsel are
now well aware. Deferral for a generation, in a 6% world, is tantamount to three-fourths
exemption. In a 12% world, it is tantamount to fifteen-sixteenths exemption."); Daniel I.
Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506, 506
(1986) ("Questions of timing-such as the correct period for reporting income or claiming
deductions-present some of the most critical and vexing issues in the design of an income
tax."); Stephen B. Land, Defeating Deferral: A Proposal for Retrospective Taxation, 52 TAX
L. REV. 45, 46 (1996) ("The next best thing to not paying tax is putting it off. This princi-
ple, more than any other, has motivated tax planning over the years.").
2. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Tax Responses to Financial Contract Innovation, 50
TAX L. REV. 491, 492 (1995) ("Changing from a realization-based income tax to another
system may be the only complete solution to problems raised by financial innovation.");
Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration Proposal, 50 TAX
L. REV. 571, 572 n.] (1995) ("In a pure accrual system that did not distinguish among
income sources, financial instruments would pose little threat."); Daniel Shaviro, Risk-
Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50 TAX L. REv. 643, 651-52 (1995) ("The
workability of a tax regime for capital income that, in so many respects, uses risk-based
rules recently has come under severe and widely recognized challenge. This challenge has
resulted from the recent development of a broad array of new, widely marketed financial
products, commonly called derivatives."); Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A
Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REV. 569 (1994) (describing different frameworks for
taxing financial instruments with the focus overwhelmingly on timing issues).
3. See infra note 10.
4. See E. Cary Brown, Business-lncome Taxation and Investment Incentives, in IN.
COME, EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300,
302-14 (1948), reprinted in AM. ECON. ASSN., READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION
525-37 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959).
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gross income the future annual return of the asset. Although a number of
leading commentators have expressed the model in slightly different
words, 5 the focus and confusion has always been on the concept of ex-
cluding the future annual return (or future investment income) of the
asset from gross income. I believe that one aspect of Professor Brown's
model has been almost completely ignored in the tax literature. He dis-
cusses the "partnership" that takes place between the taxpayer and the
government in a tax deferral situation.6 Understanding this partnership
analogy removes much of the mystery surrounding tax deferral and, as a
result, will be referred to numerous times in this article. Equally impor-
tant, the partnership analogy clearly demonstrates the idea of excluding
the future annual return of the asset from gross income, which, as previ-
5. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal In-
come Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1126 (1974) ("[Wlhere rates are constant, deferring the
tax is the equivalent of imposing the tax initially, but exempting any subsequent profit due
to continued investment of what is left after payment of the tax."); Martin D. Ginsburg,
Teaching Tax Law After Tax Reform, 65 WASH. L. REV. 595, 604 (1990) ("Assuming stabil-
ity of tax rates and investment yields, deduction at initiation of the cost of an investment is
the equivalent of excluding from gross income the taxpayer's future annual return on her
investment."); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 304 (3d ed. 1995) ("The tax savings that occur when the
cost of an investment is immediately deductible, under certain conditions, can be described
as equivalent to disallowing the deduction initially but exempting from tax the income
from the investment."); Jane C. Gravelle, The Economics of Taxing Capital Income in Tax
Conversations: A Guide to the Key Issues in the Tax Reform Debate 223, 241 (Richard
Krever ed., 1997) ("Early on, it was recognized, for example, that deducting the cost of an
investment when purchased eliminated any tax on the investment."); Daniel I. Halperin,
The Time Value of Money-1984, 23 TAX NOTES 751, 752 (1984) ("The concept that defer-
ral is equivalent to immediate taxation accompanied by the avoidance of tax on the contin-
ued investment of the after-tax earnings ...."); Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money Investing
Under the Income Tax, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1019, 1022 ("Under the Cary Brown thesis, the
ability to make an investment with untaxed soft money is usually as valuable as exempting
subsequent investment income from tax."); Richard A. Musgrave, Clarifying Tax Reform,
70 TAX NOTES 731, 735 (1996) ("By allowing immediate deduction of the investment cost
against other income, the government in effect renders an interest-free loan to the investor.
In the course of continuous reinvestment, this loan will generate an income stream the
present value of which, after tax, equals the tax on the normal return on the initial invest-
ment."); CARL S. SHOUP, PUBLIC FINANCE 302 n.20 (1969) ("The fact that completely ac-
celerated depreciation, when coupled with complete loss offset, is equivalent to exemption
of net return from the asset, under an income tax, was discovered by E. Cary Brown.");
Gene Steuerle, Zero Tax Rates on Returns to New Investment & Learning, 72 TAX NOTES
1311, 1311 (1996) ("If tax rates are constant throughout time-admittedly a strong assump-
tion-pure ex ante and pure ex post taxes leave the taxpayer in exactly the same position
when all is said and done."); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt, and
Tax Arbitrage, 38 TAX LAW. 549, 551 (1985) ("An immediate deduction for the cost of a
capital asset, which is often called expensing, can produce the same results as exempting
the income produced by the asset under certain conditions .... ).
6. The partnership analogy has been touched on by several leading commentators but
has not been explored in great detail. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 260-62 (4th ed. 1991); Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital
Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 TAX L. REV. 17, 25 (1996); Mary Louise Fellows, A
Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 MICH. L. REV. 722, 749 n.63 (1990); Johnson,
supra note 5, at 1027-30; Land, supra note 1, at 83-84; Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George R.
Zodrow, The Economic Case for Foreign Tax Credits for Cash Flow Taxes, 51 NAT'L TAX J.
1, 5-6 (1998); MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A. WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRAT-
EGY: A PLANNING APPROACH ch. 3 (1992); STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX RE-
FORM 124, 323 n.5, 324 n.7 (1973).
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ously stated, has created a tremendous amount of confusion over the
years. In fact, it is difficult to see how one can understand the concept of
expensing being equivalent to exclusion without fully understanding the
partnership analogy of the Cary Brown model.
The Cary Brown model became known in the American tax law litera-
ture primarily because of professors Stanley Surrey and William Andrews
of Harvard Law School. 7 Professor Surrey made the United States gov-
ernment aware of tax deferral and time value of money issues during his
tenure as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy from 1961 to
1969. Professor Andrews wrote a brilliant tax article in 1974 focusing on
the consumption tax and discussing the Cary Brown model in great
detail.8
The Cary Brown model will be discussed in five different situations.
The first situation demonstrates the Cary Brown model in its most basic
form-that of an immediate deduction, often referred to as expensing.
The next three situations demonstrate further applications of the model
in situations unfamiliar to many people, focusing on the income side, as
opposed to the deduction side, and demonstrating the wide-ranging appli-
cability of the model. The last situation, involving unrealized apprecia-
tion, is a variation on the basic model and yields some interesting results.
It should be noted that this Article focuses solely on tax deferral, mean-
ing either deferral of income or acceleration of a deduction. So, for ex-
ample, unrealized appreciation in property will be discussed in detail
while unrealized depreciation in property will not be discussed at all.
II. IMMEDIATE DEDUCTION
A. INTRODUCTION
Assume an individual, T, has $10,000 of gross income, which could be
salary, interest, dividends, or rent. Regardless of the source, it is gross
income, and the individual must pay taxes on it. Unless otherwise stated
(which will occur later), we will assume a tax rate of 40%, taxes are due
immediately (so ignore withholding and estimated tax payments), and the
taxpayer's pre-tax rate of return on investments and borrowings is 10%. 9
7. See, e.g., Stanley S. Surrey, The Tax Reform Act of 1969-Tax Deferral and Tax
Shelters, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 307 (1971); SURREY, supra note 6, ch. 4, app. to
ch. 4; Andrews, supra note 5, at 1113.
8. See Andrews, supra note 5, at 1123-28.
9. See GRAETZ & SCHENK. supra note 5, at 306-07 (describing in detail the conditions
that must exist when applying the Cary Brown model, which include: (1) constant tax rates;
(2) constant interest rates; (3) expensing produces an immediate tax savings equal to the
taxpayer's marginal rate multiplied by the expensed amount; (4) taxpayers are concerned
only with their after-tax position; (5) the ratio of borrowing to after-tax investment is the
same under a yield exemption and an immediate deduction; and (6) the system is closed);
Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575
(1979); Johnson, supra note 5, at 1031-36; RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUB-




Assume that individual T has three investment options with the money.
Under the first option, T can invest in a tax-exempt bond (when T re-
ceives the interest on the bond, the interest is not included in gross in-
come). The second option is to invest in a regular taxable bond (the
interest received on the bond is included in T's gross income). The third
option is a little different. Under this option, the cost of the bond is im-
mediately deductible, but the interest is fully taxable.
Table 1 demonstrates the results under each of the three options.
Under the first two options, T must pay $4,000 in taxes immediately to
the government, thereby having only $6,000 to invest. Under the third
option, T must pay $4,000 in taxes when the bond matures, thereby hav-
ing $10,000 to invest at the outset.
TABLE 1
Deductible
Tax-Exempt Bond Taxable Bond Taxable Bond
Gross Income $10,000 $10,000 $10,000
Deductions $ 0 $ 0 $10,000
Taxes (40%) $ 4,000 $ 4,000 $ 0
Cash to Invest $ 6,000 $ 6,000 $10,000
Return at 10% $ 600 $ 600 $ 1,000
Taxes (40%) Exempt $ 240 $ 400
Net Return $ 600 $ 360 $ 600
Compare options one and three in Table 1. The bottom-line results are
identical for options one and three. Immediately deducting the cost of an
asset and taxing the return on the asset (option three) is equivalent to
allowing no immediate deduction but exempting from gross income the
future annual return on the asset (option one). This is probably the clear-
est demonstration of the Cary Brown model. The equivalence between
options one and three has been recognized by, among others, the Kemp
Commission in 1996, in trying to decide whether to allow an immediate
deduction of an asset or to exempt the gross income from the asset.10
10. See National Comm'n on Econ. Growth and Tax Reform, Unleashing America's
Potential, reproduced in 70 TAX NOTES 413, 425 (1996) ("In order to end these biases
[against work, saving, and investment], the tax system must either let savers deduct their
saving or exclude the returns on the saving from their taxable income. It must end double-
taxation of businesses and their owners and permit expensing of investment outlays."); see
also John S. Nolan, Erwin N. Griswold Lecture: The Merit of an Income Tax Versus a Con-
sumption Tax, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 207, 208 (1995) ("The key to understanding the basic
equivalence of these two systems [the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax and the Armey flat tax] as
being solely taxes on consumption is that the economic effect of not taxing an amount
received, but taxing the investment returns on that amount, as in the USA Tax, is exactly
the same as taxing the amount received but not taxing the investment returns, as in the
Armey flat tax."); Martin D. Ginsburg, Taxing the Components of Income: A U.S. Perspec-
tive, 86 GEO. L.J. 123, 132 (1997) (questioning whether the legislative sponsors of the USA
Tax and the Armey flat tax understand the equivalence described by the Cary Brown
model). As to the flat tax and the USA Tax, see ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA,
THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995), reprinted in 68 TAX NOTES 1 (Special Supp.) (August 4,
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This example can be generalized algebraically. In the case of option
one, there is no deduction for the cost of the bond, the interest on the
bond is tax-exempt, and an amount A of income is reduced by tax t such
that A(1 - t) may be invested. At an annual rate of return r, A(1 - t)
invested will earn rA(1 - t) per year, which will not be subject to tax. The
taxpayer's net annual after-tax position each year will be:
rA(1 - t).
In the case of option two, there is no deduction for the cost of the
bond, the interest on the bond is taxable, and an amount A of income is
reduced by tax t such that A(1 - t) may be invested. At an annual rate of
return r, A(1 - t) invested will earn rA(1 - t) per year, which will be sub-
ject to tax at rate t, equaling tax each year of trA(1 - t). The taxpayer's
net annual after-tax position each year will be:
rA(1 - t) - trA(1 - t), which equals rA(1 - t)(1 - t).
In the case of option three, there is an immediate deduction for the
cost of the bond, the interest on the bond is taxable, and an amount A of
income is not reduced by tax t such that A may be invested. At an annual
rate of return r, A invested will earn rA per year, which will be subject to
tax at rate t, equaling tax each year of trA. The taxpayer's net annual
after-tax position each year will be:
rA - trA, which equals rA(1 - t).
This is equal to the taxpayer's net annual after-tax position when no
deduction is allowed for the cost of the bond but the interest on the bond
is exempt from tax.''
B. PARTNERSHIP ANALOGY
How would Cary Brown describe option three? He would say that by
immediately deducting the cost of an asset that will generate future in-
come, the government is, in essence, entering into a partnership with the
taxpayer.' 2 In other words, by allowing the taxpayer to immediately de-
duct the cost of the bond, which will generate income in the future, the
government is, in essence, contributing $4,000 towards the purchase of
the bond. The taxpayer is contributing $6,000 towards the purchase of
1995), and USA Tax System: Description and Explanation of the Unlimited Savings Allow-
ance Income Tax System, 66 TAx NOTES 1483 (Special Supp.) (1995).
11. Of course, the interest on the tax-exempt bond will, in all likelihood, be lower than
the interest received from a regular taxable bond.
12. Professor Brown described the partnership as follows:
By paying the entrepreneur the tax on the asset's cost, the Government
would literally be a partner in the firm. It would make a capital contribution
on new investments at the same rate at which it shared in the future net
receipts of the enterprise. The contribution would be made at the same time
the investment was undertaken.
Brown, supra note 4, at 309-10.
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the bond. They are, in a sense, a "partnership." During the first year
after purchase, the bond generates $1,000 of interest income (it will do
this each year until maturity). Of the $1,000 of interest income, $400 in
taxes is paid to the government, and the taxpayer keeps $600. Is this
$1,000 of interest income taxed though? The obvious answer seems to be
"yes," as the government receives $400 of it. But the $1,000 of interest
income really is not taxed at all. The government put up 40% of the cost
of the bond. Now it is simply receiving its 40% share of the return on the
bond (or $400) each year. The taxpayer put up 60% of the cost of the
bond and is getting his 60% share of the return on the bond (or $600)
each year. If this is the final result, then in essence, the taxpayer is not
taxed on the interest income. Therefore, immediate deduction is
equivalent to excluding the return on the asset from gross income.
TABLE 2
Contributions to Income of the
the Partnership Partnership
Taxpayer $ 6,000 $ 600
Government $ 4,000 $ 400
TOTAL $10,000 $1,000
The taxpayer should be taxed by the government on his 60% share or
$600 of interest income (highlighted in Table 2), otherwise the income is
excluded from gross income according to the Cary Brown model. The
key is for the government to tax the taxpayer's $600 share of interest
income if the government wants to prevent the time value of money ben-
efit of tax deferral from taking place. If the taxpayer's $600 share of in-
terest income is taxed at 40%, then the taxpayer pays $240 in taxes,
leaving the taxpayer with $360 after taxes. This is equivalent to option
two (the nondeductible taxable bond). The tax deferral benefit has been
eliminated. 13 It looks like the government is double-taxing the taxpayer,
but in substance, it is not.
Under option three, when the bond matures, the taxpayer receives
$10,000 and has $10,000 of gross income because the taxpayer's basis in
the bond is zero. 14 At a 40% tax rate, the taxpayer will owe the govern-
ment $4,000 at maturity. This is, in essence, merely returning the portion
the government originally invested with the taxpayer as a partnership. In
other words, the partnership is terminated, the taxpayer receives his orig-
inal contribution of $6,000, and the government is returned its original
contribution of $4,000.
13. Of course, the government could have eliminated the tax deferral benefit by sim-
ply disallowing the initial expensing of the bond. But for purposes of this example, we are
assuming that the cost of the bond can be expensed.





Income of the Termination of the
Contributions to Partnership Partnership (Return of
the Partnership Each Year Contributions)
Taxpayer $ 6,000 $ 600 $ 6,000
Government $ 4,000 $ 400 $ 4,000
TOTAL $10,000 $1,000 $t0,000
C. KEY STEPS IN THE PARTNERSHIP ANALOGY
A number of steps and conclusions can be drawn from Professor
Brown's partnership analogy with respect to the above example:
1. The partnership is formed between the taxpayer and the govern-
ment at the time tax deferral takes place, whether deferring income or
accelerating a deduction. In the above example, tax deferral takes place
at the time the bond is expensed. 15 The taxpayer contributes to the part-
nership the amount expensed less the taxes saved by expensing. In the
above example, the taxpayer's contribution to the partnership is $10,000
(expensed amount) less $4,000 (taxes saved by expensing), or $6,000. The
government contributes to the partnership the taxes saved by expensing.
In the above example, it is $10,000 (expensed amount) multiplied by 40%
(tax rate), or $4,000.
2. The profits of the partnership are allocated between the taxpayer
and the government based on the tax rate in effect on the investment
income generated by the partnership. Assuming a 40% tax rate, the prof-
its of the partnership will be allocated 60% to the taxpayer and 40% to
the government. This allocation ratio will not change from year to year
(unless the tax rate on the investment income changes, in which case the
allocation ratio will also change). Assuming constant tax rates, the allo-
cation of profits is formally a tax; in essence, it is not. It is merely allocat-
ing the profits of the partnership between the two partners-the taxpayer
and the government.
3. The government should collect its share of the profits (allocated
under step two) at least annually to prevent an additional (or continuing)
tax deferral situation from taking place.
4. The taxpayer should be allocated his share of the profits annually
but does not need to collect it annually. If the taxpayer collects his share
of the profits of the partnership annually, the government should tax the
profits at that time. If the taxpayer leaves his share of the profits in the
partnership, then the government can wait to tax the profits. 16
15. Actually, tax deferral takes place when the taxes are owed to the government.
This distinction becomes important, for example, when dealing with the interest charge
rule with respect to certain large installment sales. See infra Part Ill (discussing installment
sales).
16. We will see later that this fourth step is the key to the principle credited to Profes-
sors Daniel Halperin and Alvin Warren that, under certain conditions. there is no advan-
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5. When the tax deferral period ends, the partnership is terminated,
and both the taxpayer and the government should have their original con-
tributions returned. In addition, the taxpayer should collect any profits of
the partnership he has not previously collected (see step four), and the
government should tax those profits.
TABLE 4
Allocation of Income
Partnership of the Partnership Partnership
Contributions (Steps Two, Three, Termination
(Step One) and Four) (Step Five)
Taxpayer Deferred Income Income Times One Return of Contribu-
Less Taxes Deferred Minus the Tax Rate tion Plus Any
(A - At) equaling (Ar - Art) equaling Remaining Share of
A(1 - t) rA(1 - t) the Partnership
Income Not Previ-
ously Collected
Government Taxes Deferred (At) Income Times Tax Return of Contribu-
Rate (Art) tion
TOTAL Deferred Income Income for the Year Contributions Plus
(A) (Ar) Any Remaining




The second situation is a very specific application of the Cary Brown
model, and it also suggests various solutions to eliminating tax deferral
that are not mark-to-market. Assume an individual owns land with a
negligible basis and a fair market value of $10,000. The individual has
two options for selling the land. First is an all-cash sale of the land for
$10,000. The second option is to sell it to a buyer who will pay the sales
price in two years-an installment sale. The buyer will also pay the seller
10% interest each year until the sales price is paid off.
Under option one (the all-cash sale), the seller will pay $4,000 in taxes
at the time of sale, leaving the seller with $6,000. The seller can invest
this amount at a 10% pre-tax rate of return. At the end of one year, the
seller will have $6,000, plus $600 return, less $240 in taxes, totaling $6,360
($6,000 multiplied by 1.06). At the end of two years, the seller will have
$6,741.60 ($6,000 multiplied by (1.06)2).
If an individual makes an installment sale and reports the gain on the
installment method, then the seller does not include the gain in gross in-
come at the time of sale. 17 The gain is deferred because the buyer has not
tage to tax deferral if the deferred amount increases by the after-tax rate of return. See
infra Part V.A.
17. See I.R.C. § 453(a) (1994).
1999]
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paid anything yet. At the end of the first year, the seller will receive
$1,000 of interest from the buyer ($10,000 multiplied by 10%). The seller
will pay $400 in taxes, leaving the seller with $600. At the end of year
two, the seller will receive another $1,000 in interest from the buyer plus
$10,000 of the sales price. The seller will also have invested the $600 from
year one. The seller will have, at the end of year two, $7,236. Again, this
is consistent with the Cary Brown model. Deferring the gain in an asset
under the installment method is equivalent to exempting from gross in-
come the future annual return on the recognized gain. What makes an
installment sale interesting with respect to the Cary Brown model is that
a realization event has taken place (the sale) between the time of appreci-
ation in the property and the recognition of the appreciation as gain.
This example can be generalized algebraically. In the case of a cash
sale in which tax is immediately imposed, an amount A of gain is reduced
by tax t such that A(1 - t) may be invested. At an annual rate of return r,
A(1 - t) invested will earn rA(1 - t) per year, which will be subject to tax at
rate t equaling tax each year of trA(1 - t). The seller's net annual after-tax
position each year will be:
rA(1 - t) - trA(1 - t), which equals rA(1 - t)(1 - t).
In the case of an installment sale to which section 453 applies, the
amount A of gain is not reduced by tax t. At an annual rate of return r, A
invested will earn rA per year, which will be subject to tax at rate t, equal-
ing tax each year of trA. The seller's net annual after-tax position will be:
rA - trA, which equals rA(1 - t).
This is higher than the seller's net annual after-tax position when an all-
cash sale is made and tax is immediately imposed. It is equal to the
seller's net annual after-tax position when an all-cash sale is made, tax is
immediately imposed, and the return of rA(1 - t) is exempt from tax.
B. ATT-ACKING TAX DEFERRAL
In the mid-1980s, the U.S. government recognized the tax deferral that
takes place in an installment sale and decided to do something about it.18
18. In 1984, the Treasury Department recognized the tax deferral benefit that sellers
receive using the installment method but concluded, at that time, not to eliminate the ben-
efit. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIR-
NESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 129 (1984). Treasury did not propose charging
interest on the taxes being deferred through use of the installment method "because of the
increased complexity and taxpayer perception problems that such an approach would cre-
ate." Id. The report stated that "[mlost taxpayers would not readily comprehend why they
should pay interest on the deferred taxes when the taxes are only paid as installment pay-
ments are received." Id. One leading commentator was quoted as saying that Treasury's
reasoning in not charging interest on the deferred taxes "makes no sense." See Lee A.
Sheppard, Ginsburg Discusses Taxing the Privilege of Tax Deferral in instalnent Sales, 27
TAX NOTES 457, 458 (1985). Congress, in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1987, imposed an interest charge regime on certain sellers of prop-
erty that use the installment method. See I.R.C. § 453A(c).
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Let's focus on the first year after the sale. During that first year, the
buyer pays $1,000 of interest to the seller. By deferring the taxes on the
gain of $10,000, Cary Brown would describe the government as being in
partnership with the seller-the government contributing $4,000 and the
seller contributing $6,000 (step one). Of the $1,000 in interest paid from
buyer to seller the first year, $400 of taxes is owed to the government. In
essence, the partnership generates $1,000 of interest income, which is al-
located $600 to the seller and $400 to the government (step two). The
government should collect this $400 to prevent additional tax deferral
from taking place (step three). In essence, the $1,000 of interest income
is not taxed.
TABLE 5
Contributions to Income of the
the Partnership Partnership
Taxpayer $ 6,000 $ 600
Government $ 4,000 $ 400
TOTAL $10,000 $1,000
The seller's portion of the $1,000 is $600, which is the seller's return
from the partnership (step two). The government should collect tax of
40% on the seller's share if it wants to eliminate the time value of money
benefit of tax deferral in an installment sale (step four). Consequently,
the government should collect $240 in taxes from the seller (40% multi-
plied by $600). Therefore, the government should collect a total of $640
($400 plus $240) from the seller in the first year after the sale. It looks
like the $1,000 of interest income is double-taxed, but it really is not. The
$400 the government collects on the $1,000 of interest income is actually
the government's share of the profits of the partnership it has entered
into with the taxpayer. The $240 the government collects from the tax-
payer is a tax on the taxpayer's share of the profits of the partnership.
This procedure should be done again in year two. If so, at the end of year
two, the seller will have $6,741.60-the exact same result as if the seller
made an all-cash sale.
What the U.S. government does is to charge interest on the taxes that
are deferred by the installment method.19 The interest charge rules rep-
resent a congressional judgment that the seller can reasonably be thought
of as owing the tax on the gain from the time of the installment sale and
that the deferral of recognition is only a matter of legislative grace. In the
case of the installment sale, at the end of the first year, the seller has
19. See I.R.C. § 453A(c). Under the interest charge method, the government is view-
ing tax deferral not as a partnership between the taxpayer and the government but rather
as a non-interest bearing loan from the government to the taxpayer. See, e.g., Musgrave,
supra note 5, at 735 (viewing tax deferral as an interest-free loan from the government to
the investor); SURREY, supra note 6, at 120-25 (discussing both the partnership and the
loan views of tax deferral).
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deferred $4,000 in taxes. Therefore, the U.S. government requires the
seller to pay interest to the government-assuming a 10% interest rate,
$400 in interest is owed to the government ($4,000 deferred taxes multi-
plied by 10% interest rate). 21 If the seller can deduct the interest, then
this is really an out-of-pocket payment of only $240 ($400 interest pay-
ment minus $160 tax savings), leaving the seller with $360. This is the
exact same result as taxing the seller on $600 of the interest income,
which results in $240 in additional taxes, again leaving the seller with
$360. For individuals, however, the U.S. government maintains that the
interest payment is not deductible, which actually makes the installment
sale worse than an all-cash sale.21 The seller will be left with $200 ($600
minus $400), which is an incorrect result.22
Even though the U.S. government utilizes an interest charge method,
Professor Brown's partnership analogy in describing tax deferral demon-
strates the correct result and the impropriety of denying the seller's inter-
est deduction. The purpose of the interest charge is to achieve parity, not
to penalize. But apparently as a partial consolation, the interest charge
rule only applies to installment sales over $5 million. Or, alternatively,
the $5 million de minimis rule may be simply to confine the interest
charge rule to large installment sales.
The interest charge method can be generalized algebraically. In the
case of an installment sale to which section 453A(c) applies, the amount
A of gain is not reduced by tax t. At an annual rate of return r, A in-
vested will earn rA per year, which will be subject to tax at rate t equaling
tax each year of trA. If interest r is charged on the deferred tax liability
of tA, then the interest on deferred tax liability is rtA. The deduction of
the interest on deferred tax liability will be trAt, leaving the seller with an
interest burden of rAt - trAt, which equals rAt(1 - t). The seller's net
annual after-tax position will be:
rA(l - t) - rAt(1 - t), which equals rA(1 - t)(1 - t).
This is equal to the seller's net annual after-tax position when a cash
sale is made and tax is immediately imposed.
20. There is a $5 million de minimis rule, which is ignored for purposes of this exam-
ple. See I.R.C. § 453A(c)(4). In addition, the interest rate on deferred tax liability used by
the government is the federal short-term rate plus three percentage points. See I.R.C.
§ 453A(c)(2)(B).
21. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (stating that personal interest is not deductible); Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i) (1987) (stating that interest on deferred tax liability is
treated as interest on a tax deficiency, which is treated as personal interest).
22. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, No. 98-1401, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 7591, at *13(4th Cir. Apr. 20, 1999) (finding regulation § 1.163-9T to be a reasonable construction of
I.R.C. § 163(h)); Miller v. United States, 65 F.3d 687, 691 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
regulation § 1.163-9T is valid as a permissible construction of the statute); Redlark v. Com-
missioner, 141 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 1997), (holding that regulation § 1.163-9T is valid),
rev'g 106 T.C. 31 (1996)); Stecher v. United States, No. 97-WY-1892-AJ, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10173, at *12 (D. Colo. June 1, 1998) (holding that regulation § 1.163-9T is a rea-
sonable interpretation of Congressional intent). But see, e.g., Kikalos v. Commissioner, 75
T.C.M. (CCH) 1924, 1933 (1998) (holding that regulation § 1.163-9T is invalid).
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If the seller cannot deduct the interest on deferred tax liability, then
the seller's net annual after-tax position is rA(1 - t) - rAt. The seller is
worse off by the amount of tax that would be saved by the deduction of
the interest on the deferred tax liability.
The partnership analogy also demonstrates when the interest paid by
the seller should be deducted. It should first be paid beginning in the
year after sale and deducted in that year. The government, however,
charges the interest at the end of the year of sale (and each subsequent
year until the installment obligation is no longer outstanding). As a re-
sult, the interest is really an advance charge imposed by the government
to prevent the time value of money benefit of tax deferral. 23 This is why
no interest is charged in the year that the installment obligation is com-
pletely paid off and why the interest is not prorated for the year of sale.24
C. VARYING TAX RATES
1. Known Capital Gains Tax Rate
What if the tax rate on the gain deferred by the installment method is
different than the tax rate on the interest income generated by the install-
ment obligation? Does the partnership analogy still hold? The answer
formally is "yes," although substantively this is different than the Cary
Brown model because the assumption of constant tax rates is changed.
Assume the $10,000 of gain that is deferred will be subject to a 28% capi-
tal gains tax rate when it is recognized in a later year.25 The pre-tax rate
of return is still 10%, but the tax rate on the interest income is 40%, i.e.,
the seller is in the 40% tax bracket each year.
Let us focus on the first year after the sale. During that first year, the
buyer pays $1,000 of interest to the seller. By deferring the taxes on the
gain of $10,000, Cary Brown would describe the government as being in
partnership with the seller-the government contributes $2,800, and the
seller contributes $7,200 (step one). Of the $1,000 in interest paid from
buyer to seller the first year, $400 of taxes is owed to the government.
The $400 of taxes collected by the government is its share of the profits of
the partnership that it entered into with the seller (steps two and three).
The tax rate is in essence 28% (not 40%) on the entire transaction. The
40% tax rate on the interest income is the allocation percentage for the
profits of the partnership (step two).
23. See Christopher H. Hanna & Samuel Olchyk, Interest Under Section 453A(c): Is It
or Isn't It?, 56 TAX NoTEs 1345, 1350 (1992) ("The interest on deferred tax liability [under
section 453A(c)] computed at the close of the year of sale should be deductible in the
following year, not in the year of sale. The reason is that the interest on deferred tax
liability relates to the delay in paying tax on the gain through use of the installment
method.").
24. See id.
25. See Mostowy v. United States, 966 F.2d 668, 671 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (taxpayers made
a contract in 1985 but collected the payment in 1988; the tax rate in 1988 was used to
determine the tax owed to the government even though the rate in 1985, the year of the





Income of the Partnership
Contributions to Partnership (Return of
the Partnership Each Year Contributions)
Taxpayer $ 7,200 $ 600 $ 7,200
Government $ 2,800 $ 400 $ 2,800
TOTAL $10,000 $1,000 $10,000
The seller's portion of the $1,000 is $600, which is the seller's portion of
the profits from the partnership (step two). The government should col-
lect tax of 28% on the seller's share if it wants to eliminate the time value
of money benefit of tax deferral in an installment sale (step four). Again,
the tax rate on the entire transaction is 28%. Consequently, the govern-
ment should collect $168 in taxes from the seller ($600 multiplied by
28%) (step four). Therefore, the government should collect a total of
$568 ($400 plus $168) from the seller in year one, leaving the seller with
$432 ($1,000 minus $568). The $400 the government collects on the
$1,000 of interest income is the government's share of the profits of the
partnership it has entered into with the taxpayer. The $168 the govern-
ment collects from the taxpayer is a tax on the taxpayer's share of the
profits of the partnership. This procedure should be done again in year
two. If so, at the end of year two, the seller will have $8,089.92, the exact
same result as if the seller made an all-cash sale, and the capital gains tax
rate at the time of sale was 28%.
The U.S. government uses an interest charge method with respect to
certain large installment sales.26 In the case of the installment sale, at the
end of the first year, the seller has deferred $2,800 in taxes. Therefore,
the U.S. government requires the seller to pay interest to the govern-
ment-assuming a 10% interest rate, $280 in interest is owed the govern-
ment ($2,800 deferred taxes multiplied by 10% interest rate). 27 If the
seller can deduct the interest, then this is really an out-of-pocket payment
of only $168 ($280 interest payment minus $112 tax savings). This is the
exact same result as taxing the seller on $600 of the interest income,
which resulted in $168 in additional taxes. As stated previously though,
the interest represents an advance charge by the government for the
seller's deferral of taxes through use of the installment method.
2. Unknown Capital Gains Tax Rate
What if the tax rate on the capital gain that is deferred by the install-
ment method is not known? In other words, the rate in the year of sale is,
26. See I.R.C. § 453A(c) (1994).
27. There is a $5 million de minimis rule, which is ignored for purposes of this exam-
ple. See I.R.C. § 453A(c)(4). In addition, the interest rate on deferred tax liability used by




for example, 20%, but may change in two years when the seller collects
the sales price. 28 The government could simply use the appropriate capi-
tal gains rate in effect each year that the installment obligation is out-
standing, as it does under section 453A(c). Alternatively, the government
could wait until the end of the deferral period to eliminate the tax defer-
ral benefit. The partnership analogy, slightly modified, still works in this
latter case.
Let's focus on the first year after the sale. By deferring the taxes on the
gain of $10,000, Cary Brown would describe the government as being in
partnership with the seller. The government contributes some unknown
amount because the tax rate on the deferred capital gain is not known,
and the seller contributes $10,000 less the government's amount (step
one). The contributions to the partnership still total $10,000.
Of the $1,000 in interest paid from buyer to seller the first year, $400 of
taxes is owed to the government. The $400 of taxes collected by the gov-
ernment is its share of the profits of the partnership that it entered into
with the seller (steps two and three). The tax rate is some unknown per-
centage on the entire transaction. The 40% tax rate on the interest in-
come is the allocation percentage for the profits of the partnership (step
two).
The seller's portion of the $1,000 is $600, which is the seller's portion of
the profits from the partnership (step two). The government should col-
lect tax of an unknown percentage on the seller's share ($600) if it wants
to eliminate the time value of money benefit of tax deferral in an install-
ment sale (step four). The government can collect it at the end of the
deferral period (step five) by treating the seller's share of the profits as
staying in the partnership (step four).
In year two, the partnership generates $1,060, which is allocated 60%
to the seller and 40% to the government because that is the tax rate in
effect on the investment income (step two). 29 The government collects
$424 ($1,060 multiplied by 40%) (step three). At the end of year two, the
seller collects the $10,000 owed by the buyer. Let us assume that the tax
rate in effect at the end of year two is 28% on the seller's capital gain.
The government should tax the seller's share of the profits of the partner-
ship, which is $1,236 ($600 from year one plus $636 from year two). At a
28% tax rate, the tax owed to the government is $346.08 ($1,236 multi-
plied by 28%). The government will also receive its contribution to the
partnership, which was originally unknown and now is determined to be
$2,800 ($10,000 multiplied by 28%). The seller will have $1,236 (share of
the profits of the partnership) less $346.08 (taxes on those profits) plus
$7,200 (share of his contribution to the partnership). The seller will have
a total of $8,089.92, the exact same result as if the seller made an all-cash
28. See, e.g., Mostowy, 966 F.2d at 671.
29. This $1,060 would actually be derived by the $1,000 of interest income paid by the
buyer to the seller in year two and the $60 of interest income earned by the seller from the
$600 retained from the previous year.
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sale (subject to a 28% capital gains tax rate). In this case, it does not
matter if the government taxes the taxpayer's share of the profits of the
partnership annually (step four) or at the end of the deferral period (step
five).
IV. DEFERRAL OF PREPAID INCOME 311
The interest charge rules are used in many situations today.3' It ap-
pears to be the U.S. government's preferred method for eliminating tax
deferral. But it is only one of several methods. 32 Another method is to
impute income and tax the imputed income.33 Under the imputed in-
come method, the government, in a tax deferral situation involving pre-
paid service income of an accrual method taxpayer, currently imputes
income at a pre-tax rate of return, which appears to be inaccurate.34 The
income should be imputed at an after-tax rate of return.35
Assume on January 1, 1998, an accrual method automobile dealer re-
ceives $1,000 for a service warranty contract that carries a term of two
years. The automobile dealer pays to an unrelated third party $1,000 to
insure its obligations under the service warranty contract. In addition,
assume the automobile dealer elects to use the service warranty income
30. The literature on the taxation of prepaid income is quite voluminous. See, eg.,
Jeffrey P. Cantrell et al., Notice 89-21 Crashes the Interest Rate Swap Party, 45 TAX NOTES
337 (1989): Alan Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax Accounting, 4
VA. TAX REV. 1 (1984); Laurie L. Malman, Treatment of Prepaid Income-Clear Reflection
of Income or Muddied Waters, 37 TAX L. REV. 103 (1981); Robert H. Scarborough,
Payments in Advance of Performance, 69 TAXES 798 (1991).
Generally, commentators are split on whether prepaid service income should be taxed
on receipt by an accrual method taxpayer or whether the income should be deferred and
included in gross income over the period of time in which the services will be rendered.
See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, The Illegitimate "Earned" Requirement in Tax and Nontax
Accounting, 50 TAX L. REV. 373, 379 (1995) (arguing that prepaid service income should
be included in income upon receipt) [hereinafter Johnson, The Illegitimate "Earned"
Requirement]; W. Eugene Seago & Debra Callihan, Toward a Sound (Neutral) Tax Policyfor Prepaid Income from Services, 74 TAX NOTES 359, 360 (1997) (criticizing Professor
Johnson and arguing that prepaid service income should be included in gross income over
the life of the contract); Letter from Calvin H. Johnson, The Roads Not Traveled: Professor
Johnson Responds, 74 TAx NOTES 367 (1997) (responding to Seago and Callihan's article).
For purposes of this Article, I assume that Revenue Procedure 92-98, 1992-2 C.B. 512, is
valid in forcing inclusion of the prepayment in income and merely question whether the
applicable federal rate (AFR) used by the Service is accurate.
31. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 167(g) (West Supp. 1998) (income forecast method for deprecia-
tion), 367 (outbound transfers of property), 453(1) (1994) (installment sales of timeshare
and residential lots), 453A (large installment sales), 460 (West Supp. 1998) (long-ternm con-
tracts), 668 (West Supp. 1998) (foreign trusts), 995(f) (1994) (domestic international sales
corporations), and 1291 (West Supp. 1998) (passive foreign investment companies).
32. See Christopher H. Hanna, The Virtual Reality of Eliminating Tax Deferral, 12
AMER. J. TAX POL'Y 449, 460-507 (1995) (describing five different methods of eliminating
tax deferral-interest charge method, imputed income method, immediate inclusion in in-
come method, deposit method, and double inclusion in income method).
33. See id. at 481-90.
34. See, e.g., Daniel 1. Halperin, Assumption of Contingent Liabilities on Sale of a
Business, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 673, 695 n.59 (1996) (questioning the use of a pre-tax rate of
return but acknowledging there is precedent for its use in section 468); Hanna, supra note
32, at 481-89 (questioning whether a pre-tax rate of return is appropriate).
35. See Halperin, supra note 34, at 695 n.59; Hanna, supra note 32, at 483-89.
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method of accounting for its qualified payment amounts on service war-
ranty contracts as prescribed in Revenue Procedure 97-38.36 Under the
revenue procedure and using an applicable federal rate (AFR) of 10%,
the automobile dealer would include $523.80 in income for the year of
receipt and $523.80 in the year following the year of receipt. 37 If the
AFR is converted to an after-tax rate of return by multiplying the AFR
by the automobile dealer's assumed tax rate of 40%, then 6% should be
the rate at which the Service imputes income to the automobile dealer.
Under the revenue procedure, this would result in the automobile dealer
including $514.60 in income for the year of receipt and $514.60 in the year
following the year of receipt. Which of these rates is accurate? The part-
nership analogy should easily resolve this issue.
TABLE 7
Contributions to Income for the Termination of the
the Partnership Year After Receipt Partnership
Taxpayer $300 $30 $300
Government $200 $20 $200
TOTAL $500 $50 $500
In the year of receipt, the automobile dealer must include half ($500)
of the prepaid amount in gross income pursuant to the revenue proce-
dure. 38 Therefore, the remaining half of $500 is deferred to the next year.
This deferral of $500 of income creates the partnership between the tax-
payer and the government, with the taxpayer contributing $300 to the
partnership and the government contributing $200 (step one). In the year
after receipt, the partnership generates $50 of income. The government
taxes this at a 40% tax rate leaving $30 for the taxpayer, which is, in
36. Rev. Proc. 97-38, 1997 I.R.B. LEXIS 243, modifying and superseding Rev. Proc.
92-98, 1992-2 C.B. 512. The Service issued the 1992 revenue procedure in response to the
outcry from automobile dealers with respect to the issuance of Technical Advice Memo-
randum 92-18-004 (Jan. 23, 1992). See Lee A. Sheppard, The Goldberg Variations, or: Giv-
ing Away the Store, 58 TAx NOTES 530 (1993). A number of commentators wrote letters
with respect to the technical advice memorandum and revenue procedure. See, e.g., Letter
from James P. Holden, Lee Sheppard's Grumpy Attack, 58 TAx NOTES 1130 (1993); Letter
from Sheldon S. Cohen, In Defense of Lee Sheppard, 58 TAX NOTES 1386 (1993); Letter
from Milton Cerny, Sheppard Variations, 58 TAX NOTES 981 (1993); Letter from James P.
Fuller, In Defense of Fred Goldberg, 58 TAX NOTES 1259 (1993); Letter from George K.
Yin, The Tax Administrator's Duty to Take Pro-Government Positions, 58 TAX NOTES 1387
(1993).
37. These amounts are determined pursuant to a table provided in Revenue Procedure
97-38. Rev. Proc. 97-38, 1997 I.R.B. LEXIS 243, at *26. If the term of the service warranty
contract is longer, then obviously the income inclusion each year would also change. For
example, if the term is five years, then the amount that the automobile dealer would in-
clude in income each year would be $239.80 using an applicable federal rate of 10%, and
$224 using an applicable federal rate of 6%.
38. See Rev. Proc. 97-38, 1997 I.R.B. LEXIS 243; see also Johnson, The Illegitimate
"Earned" Requirement, supra note 30, at 383 n.39 (1995) (criticizing Revenue Procedure




substance, the allocation of the profits of the partnership (steps two and
three). The $30 allocated to the taxpayer should be taxed to prevent the
time value of money benefit of tax deferral (steps four and five). Requir-
ing the taxpayer to include $30 in income in year two is equivalent to
requiring the automobile dealer to include $14.60 in year one (the year of
receipt) and $14.60 in year two, which are the imputed amounts using an
after-tax rate of return of 6%.
If the pre-tax rate of return of 10% is used, then the automobile dealer
must include imputed income of $23.80 in year one and $23.80 in year
two. This is equivalent to requiring the automobile dealer to include $50
in year two. As Table 7 demonstrates, this is too much. Fifty dollars rep-
resents the return for the entire partnership, including the government's
portion of $20, which the government already takes as its share as a part-
ner in the partnership. Formally, the government takes its $20 as a tax on
the entire $50. If the government were to then impute $50 of income, it
would be overtaxing the automobile dealer.
The imputed income method can be demonstrated algebraically. Fo-
cusing solely on the income side of the automobile dealer, the above ex-
ample can be generalized algebraically using the following additional
assumptions: (1) the deductions to the automobile dealer are disregarded,
and (2) the option is to either include the prepaid service income on re-
ceipt or defer it until the end of the contract. In the case of immediate
recognition of income, an amount A of income is reduced by tax t such
that A(1 - t) may be invested. At an annual rate of return r, A(1 - t)
invested will earn rA(1 - t) per year, which will be subject to tax at rate t,
equaling tax each year of trA(1 - t). The automobile dealer's net annual
after-tax position each year will be:
rA(1 - t) - trA(1 - t), which equals rA(1 - t)(1 - t).
In the case of imputing interest income in which prepaid service in-
come is recognized at the end of the contract (not over the life of the
contract), an amount A of prepaid service income is not reduced by tax t
at the time of receipt. At an annual rate of return r, A invested will earn
rA per year, which will be subject to tax at rate t, equaling tax each year
of trA. In addition, interest income is imputed each year in the amount of
rA(1 - t), which is an after-tax rate of return. This is subject to tax at rate
t equaling tax each year of trA(1 - t). The automobile dealer's net annual
after-tax position will be:
rA(1 - t) - trA(1 -t), which equals rA(1 - t)(1 - t).
This is equal to the automobile dealer's net annual after-tax position
when immediate recognition of income is required and tax is immediately
imposed.
If a pre-tax rate of return is used in imputing interest income in which
prepaid service income is recognized at the end of the contract, the
amount A of prepaid service income is not reduced by tax t at the time of
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receipt. At an annual rate of return r, A invested will earn rA per year,
which will be subject to tax at rate t, equaling tax each year of trA. In
addition, interest income is imputed each year in the amount of rA, which
is a pre-tax rate of return. This is subject to tax at rate t, equaling tax
each year of trA. The automobile dealer's net annual after-tax position
will be rA(1 - t) - rAt. The automobile dealer is worse off by the amount
of tax that would be saved by only including imputed interest income at
an after-tax rate of return.
Focusing on tax deferral through Professor Brown's partnership anal-
ogy demonstrates how to achieve the proper result in eliminating tax
deferral, regardless of what method is used. If the interest charge method
is used, the interest paid to the government should be deductible (unless
the interest rate used is an after-tax rate of return). If the imputed in-




It is important to demonstrate another very crucial principle with re-
spect to tax deferral, which is credited to Professor Daniel Halperin 40 and
advanced by Professor Alvin Warren.41 Assume that T has entered into a
nonqualified deferred compensation arrangement with her employer. T
has deferred $10,000 of compensation that will be paid out in its entirety
at the end of three years. As a result of the deferred compensation plan,
T has deferred paying $4,000 in taxes (40% multiplied by $10,000 in-
come). If the deferred income amount of $10,000 increases by the after-
tax rate of return of 6%, then there is no time value of money advantage
to deferral. Assume that the employer is subject to tax on its earnings at
a 40% tax rate (and T is also in the 40% tax bracket). As a result, T's
deferred income amount will increase in value by a 6% after-tax rate of
return each year. At the end of three years, T's deferred amount is
$11,910.16. If T receives the entire amount at the end of three years, T's
income will be $11,910.16, and T will owe taxes of $4,764.06, leaving T
with $7,146.10.
39. See Halperin, supra note 34, at 695 n.59 (noting that although an after-tax rate of
return is the proper result, converting the AFR into the taxpayer's after-tax rate of return
may be too low because a taxpayer cannot borrow at the AFR).
40. See Daniel l. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95
YALE L.J. 506 (1986). This Article is probably the leading article on tax deferral and time
value of money. Professor Halperin writes that, with respect to nonqualified deferred
compensation, "it is not essential to allow a deduction or require inclusion at any particular
time. The timing can be flexible as long as the amount of the item is adjusted to achieve an
equivalence in the present discounted value of the income or deduction." Id. at 523-24.
41. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Timing of Taxes, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 499, 499 (1987)
("The present value to a taxpayer of a consistently defined tax will be the same whether
the tax is deferred or accelerated, as long as the tax rate remains constant and the base of a
deferred tax increases over time by the rate of return generally applicable to investment of
proceeds available after payment of an accelerated tax.").
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Another way of viewing the above example is that if T currently re-
ceives the compensation of $10,000, T would have $6,000 after taxes
($10,000 income less $4,000 taxes paid). T could then invest the money
and earn an after-tax rate of return of 6% annually. At the end of three
years, T would have $7,146.10. This is the exact same amount as if T
deferred the compensation for three years, and the deferred amount in-
creased by a 6% after-tax rate of return each year. T has achieved no tax
deferral benefit by deferring taxes on the original compensation of
$10,000. As a result, the example demonstrates that "deferral of income
(or deductions) is not advantageous (or disadvantageous) to taxpayers if
the deferred amount is increased by the after-income-tax rate of return"
during the deferral period.42
Can the Cary Brown model and partnership analogy illustrate this prin-
ciple of tax deferral? The answer again is "yes." Because of the deferral
that takes place as a result of the deferred compensation arrangement,
Professor Brown would describe the government as being a partner with
the taxpayer (step one). The government should be allocated (step two)
and collect its share of the profits of the partnership each year (step
three). Plus, either annually (step four) or at the end of the deferral pe-
riod (step five), the government should tax the taxpayer's profits from the
partnership to eliminate the time value of money benefit of tax deferral.
In other words, when the deferral period is terminated, the taxpayer
needs to end up with his contribution plus an after-tax rate of return on his
contribution to the partnership (the government taxing the return). This
is consistent with the five-step partnership analogy used throughout this
Article. Professors Halperin and Klein have written that Professor War-
ren's advancement "may perhaps best be described as a 'mathematical
trick.'"' 43 While that may be true, Professor Warren's advancement is
consistent with the partnership application of the Cary Brown model. 44
B. EMPLOYER IN THE SAME TAX BRACKET AS EMPLOYEE
Under the partnership analogy, because T has deferred $10,000 of in-
come, T is treated as contributing $6,000 to the partnership, and the gov-
ernment is treated as contributing $4,000 (step one). If the 10% pre-tax
rate of return on the deferred compensation is taxed each year to the
employer, then the $1,000 of earnings in the first year, although actually
taxed to the employer, is really earnings of the partnership between T
and the government. T (and not the employer) is the one deferring in-
come. As a result, T's share of the earnings is 60%, or $600 in this case
(step two). The government's share is 40%, or $400 in this case (step
42. Id. at 501; see also Halperin, supra note 40, at 523-24.
43. Letter from Daniel I. Halperin & William A. Klein, Accounting for Future Obliga-
tions-Once More, 39 TAX NOTES 266 (1988).
44. See David G. Hartman, Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment in the United
States, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 475 (1984) (applying the principle that, under certain conditions,
there is no time value of money advantage to tax deferral if the deferred amount increases
at the after-tax rate of return, in the international tax context).
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two). The government collects its $400 from the employer at the end of
year one (step three). This is not really a tax but the government's share
of profits from the partnership. The government generally does not care
from whom it collects its share of the profits as long as the share is col-
lected. In year two, the investment now of $10,600 will generate $1,060 of
earnings to the employer, which can again be described as earnings of the
partnership between T and the government. T's share of the earnings is
$636, and the government's share is $424 (step two). The government
collects its $424 from the employer at the end of year two (step three).
Again, the $424 is not really a tax, but rather it is the government's share
of profits from the partnership.
In year three, the investment now of $11,236 will generate $1,123.60 of
earnings to the employer, which can again be described as earnings of the
partnership between T and the government. T's share of the earnings is
$674.16, and the government's share is $449.44 (step two). The govern-
ment collects its $449.44 from the employer at the end of year three (step
three).
Also at the end of year three, T receives her deferred income of
$11,910.16, for which the employer is entitled to a deduction. 4 5 The de-
ferred amount can be treated as $1,910.16 of profits and $10,000 return of
contribution (step five). As to the $1,910.16 of profits, it is all allocated to
T, as the government has already been allocated its share of the profits on
its contribution to the partnership (from the employer). T is taxable on
her profit of $1,910.16 (step five). Therefore, the government collects
$764.06 of T's share of the profits ($1,910.16 of income multiplied by
40%). T is left with $1,146.10. As to the return of the contributions,
$6,000 is returned to T and $4,000 is returned to the government. Conse-
quently, T receives a total of $7,146.10, and the government receives
$4,764.06 of the total $11,910.16.
T receives no time value of money benefit by deferring taxes on the
compensation of $10,000. The government is allocated (step two) and
collects its share of the profits each year (step three) and taxes T's share
of the profits when the partnership terminates at the end of three years
(step five). 46 In other words, all five steps of the partnership analogy
45. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (1994). The employer's deduction of $11,910.16 at the time
of payment does not appear to be relevant as to the employer for purposes of the partner-
ship aspect of the Cary Brown model. It is the employee, T, who is deferring income. The
employer has neither deferred income nor accelerated a deduction. The employer merely
receives a deduction upon parting with cash of $11,910.16.
46. One reviewer of this Article suggests an alternative way of viewing the partnership
aspect of the Cary Brown model in this example. At the end of the first year, the govern-
ment should collect tax on T's share of the earnings of the partnership. The amount of tax
should be $240 ($600 multiplied by 40%). Because the government does not collect this
amount at the end of year one, the amount is treated as credited to the government's
interest in the partnership. Consequently, the government's interest is increased to $4,240.
During year two, the partnership generates $1,060 of income, of which the government's
share is $424 ($1,060 multiplied by 40%), which is 10% of its interest of $4,240. In year
two, the government should collect tax on T's share of the earnings of the partnership. The
amount of tax should be $254.40. Because the government does not collect this amount at
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eliminate the time value of money benefit of tax deferral. 47
C. EMPLOYER IN A DIFFERENT TAX BRACKET FROM EMPLOYEE
Can the partnership analogy be used if the employer and employee are
in different tax brackets? Again, the answer is formally "yes," but sub-
stantively this is different from the Cary Brown model because the as-
sumption of constant tax rates is changed. Assume the employer is in the
20% tax bracket and earns a 10% pre-tax rate of return each year. The
employee, T, is in the 40% tax bracket and earns a 10% pre-tax rate of
return each year. If the 10% pre-tax rate of return on the deferred com-
pensation is taxed each year to the employer, then the $1,000 of earnings
in the first year, although actually taxed to the employer, is really earn-
ings of the partnership between T and the government. Again, it is T
who is deferring income, not the employer. But this time, T and the gov-
ernment will share the earnings of the partnership each year on an 80%
to 20% profit sharing ratio (step two). This is clearly advantageous to T
because T has originally contributed 60% of the capital of the partnership
but is allocated 80% of the earnings each year-clearly one reason why T
would want to enter into this deferred compensation arrangement.48 As
a result, T's share of the earnings is 80%, or $800 in this case (step two).
The government's share is 20%, or $200 (step two). The government col-
lects its $200 from the employer at the end of year one (step three). This
is the government's share of profits from the partnership. As long as the
government collects its share of the profits, it does not care much or from
whom the share is collected.4 9
the end of year two, the amount is treated as credited to the government's interest in the
partnership. As a result, the government's interest is increased to $4,494.40.
During year three, the partnership generates $1,123.60 of income, of which the govern-
ment's share is $449.44 ($1,123.60 multiplied by 40%), which is 10% of its interest of
$4,494.40. In year three, the government should collect tax on T's share of the earnings of
the partnership. The amount of tax should be $269.66. When the partnership terminates at
the end of year three, the government receives $4,494.40 plus $269.66, totaling $4,764.06.
The taxpayer receives $7,146.10 ($6,000 plus $600, minus $240, plus $636, minus $254.40,
plus $674.16, minus $269.66).Under this alternative view, there is no advantage to tax
deferral because the deferred tax is credited to the government's interest in the partnership
at the end of each year. As a result, the government earns the return on the deferred tax,
not the taxpayer.The methodology in the text achieves the same numerical result as this
alternative. The purpose of the methodology in the text is to demonstrate that it does not
matter when the government taxes the taxpayer's share of profits, either annually or at the
end of the deferral period when the partnership terminates, because the time value of
money benefit of tax deferral is eliminated in either case.
47. Steps four and five are, in essence, interchangeable. As demonstrated in the Arti-
cle, the government can tax the taxpayer's share of the profits annually or at the end of the
deferral period.
48. In other words, assuming equal pre-tax returns, T will earn a higher after-tax rate
of return by entering into this deferred compensation plan with her employer than if she
immediately received the compensation and invested the after-tax proceeds on her own
behalf.
49. In this example, the government would have preferred to collect its share of the
profits from the employee if the employee's tax rate were used to determine the profit
sharing ratio. But that is not the case in a nonqualified, unfunded deferred compensation
plan.
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In year two, the investment now of $10,800 will generate $1,080 of
earnings to the employer, which can again be described as earnings of the
partnership between T and the government. T's share of the earnings is
$864, and the government's share is $216 (step two). The government
collects its $216 from the employer at the end of year two (step three).
The $216 is the government's share of profits from the partnership.
In year three, the investment now of $11,664 will generate $1,166.40 of
earnings to the employer. T's share of the "partnership" earnings is
$933.12, and the government's share is $233.28 (step two). The govern-
ment collects its $233.28 from the employer at the end of year three (step
three).
Also at the end of year three, T receives her deferred income of
$12,597.12, for which the employer is entitled to a deduction. 50 The de-
ferred amount can be treated as $2,597.12 of profits and $10,000 return of
contribution (step five). As to the $2,597.12 of profits, it is all allocated to
T, because the government has already been allocated its share of the
profits on its contribution to the partnership (from the employer). T is
taxed on her profit of $2,597.12 (step five). Therefore, the government
collects tax of $1,038.85 on T's share of the profits ($2,597.12 of income
multiplied by 40%). T is left with $1,558.27. As to the return of the con-
tributions, $6,000 is returned to T, and $4,000 is returned to the govern-
ment. Consequently, T receives a total of $7,558.27, and the government
receives $5,038.85 of the total $12,597.12.
It appears that T has received a time value of money benefit by defer-
ring taxes on the compensation of $10,000 even though T earned an after-
tax rate of return on her contribution to the partnership. This is true even
though all five steps of the partnership analogy have taken place. T's
advantage is that she is able to earn a higher after-tax rate of return on
her contribution to the partnership because the partnership generates a
higher after-tax rate of return than T can earn individually. 51 T's situa-
tion becomes closer to that of an employee participating in a qualified
plan.52 In fact, if the earnings of the partnership each year are allocated
50. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (1994). As stated previously, the employer's deduction does
not appear to be relevant as to the partnership aspect of the Cary Brown model. It is the
employee who is deferring income. The employer has neither deferred income nor acceler-
ated a deduction but rather is merely receiving a deduction upon parting with cash of
$12,597.12. See supra note 45.
51. See Halperin, supra note 40, at 523 (noting that while an employee will also benefit
from deferral if the employer can earn a higher pre-tax return than the employee, this is
not a tax policy concern).
52. See Letter from Daniel 1. Halperin, More on Deferred Compensation from Prof.
Halperin, 64 TAX NOTES 1485, 1485 (1994) ("[Tjhe advantage of qualified plans can be
described solely as tax exemption for investment income." In the case of nonqualified
plans, the amounts contributed are taxed at the employer's tax rate. "In the case of a tax-
exempt institution, the rate would be zero, the same as it is under a qualified plan. In the
case of a taxable employer, however, at least one that does not have tax losses, the rate
would be positive and fairly consistent with the employee's own rate.").
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entirely to T, perhaps because the employer is tax-exempt 53 or has a net
operating loss carry forward to eliminate any tax on the investment in-
come, then T's situation becomes almost identical to that of a participant
in a qualified plan.5 4
D. COMPARISON OF NONQUALIFIED PLANS TO QUALIFIED PLANS
Professor Halperin has written on a number of occasions that the sole
advantage of qualified plans relative to nonqualified plans from a tax
deferral standpoint is that qualified plans provide exemption of the in-
vestment income and nonqualified plans do not.55 As even Professor
Halperin has acknowledged, there still seems to be a lot of confusion in
the tax community regarding this concept.56 Perhaps the partnership
analogy can clear up the lack of understanding. Assume that T, in the
40% tax bracket, has entered into a deferred compensation arrangement
with her employer that is part of a qualified plan. T has deferred $10,000
of compensation that will be paid out in its entirety at the end of three
years. As a result of the deferred compensation plan, T has deferred pay-
ing $4,000 in taxes (40% multiplied by $10,000 income). The employer
receives a $10,000 deduction upon contributing the money to the plan.57
T, the employee, will not have income until the money is withdrawn (let
us assume at the end of three years with no penalty).58 T's deferred in-
come will increase in value by a 10% pre-tax rate of return each year.59
At the end of three years, the deferred amount is $13,310. If T receives
the entire amount at the end of three years, T's income is $13,310. After
taxes of $5,324, T is left with $7,986.
Under the partnership analogy, because T has deferred $10,000 of in-
come, T is treated as contributing $6,000 to the partnership and the gov-
ernment is treated as contributing $4,000 (step one). During the first
year, the partnership earns $1,000. Because this is a qualified plan, these
earnings are not currently taxed. 611 Using the partnership analogy, all of
the profits are allocated to T during the first year, and none are allocated
to the government (step two). Because the government is not allocated
any of the profits, it has nothing to collect from the partnership during
the first year (step three). The government does nothing to prevent tax
deferral during the first year. In other words, step one takes place, creat-
53. See I.R.C. § 457 (West Supp. 1998) (providing for deferred compensation plans of
state and local governments and tax-exempt organizations).
54. See Halperin, supra note 40, at 539-50.
55. See id.; see also Halperin, supra note 52, at 1485.
56. See Halperin, supra note 52, at 1485 (questioning whether some tax advisors really
understand the tax deferral advantage of qualified plans versus nonqualified plans).
57. See I.R.C. § 404(a) (West Supp. 1998). As stated previously with respect to non-
qualified plans, the employer's deduction does not appear relevant as to the partnership
aspect of the Cary Brown model. See supra note 45. The employer is neither deferring
income nor accelerating a deduction. The employer has actually parted with cash of
$10,000 that it will not receive back.
58. See I.R.C. § 402(a) (1994).




ing the partnership between T and the government, steps two and three
take place, but the profit sharing ratio of taxpayer to government is 100%
to 0%. In addition, steps four and five do not take place because T does
not collect her share of the profits for the government to tax (step four)
and the partnership does not terminate (step five).
During the second year, the partnership earns $1,100. Because this is a
qualified plan, these earnings are not currently taxed. All of the profits
are allocated to T during the second year, and none are allocated to the
government (step two). Thus the government has nothing to collect from
the partnership during the second year (step three). The government
does nothing to prevent tax deferral during the second year. As in the
first year, step one takes place, creating the partnership between T and
the government, steps two and three take place, but the profit-sharing
ratio is again 100% to 0%, and steps four and five do not take place.
During the third year, the partnership earns $1,210, and the funds are
distributed to T at the end of year three. Of the $1,210 earned during
year three, the government collects 40% of it, or $484; this is not due to
steps two and three, because all the year's profits are still allocated to T,
but rather due to steps four and five. The partnership also returns the
accumulated profits from the earlier years plus the capital contributions
made by T and the government. T receives $2,100 of accumulated profits,
plus $6,000 of capital contributions (step five). The accumulated profits
of $2,100 are taxed by the government (step five). At a 40% tax rate, T
owes $840. T will be left with $726 ($1,210 less $484), plus $1,260 ($2,100
less $840), plus T's capital contributions of $6,000, which total $7,986.
The government receives $484, plus $840 of taxes on T's accumulated
profits, plus $4,000 of capital contributions. This totals $5,324. The part-
nership analogy works again to describe the tax consequences of a quali-
fied plan (see Table 8).
TABLE 8
Termination of the Partnership
After Three Years (Return of
Contributions Income of the Contributions Plus Current
to the Partnership Profits Less Taxes Plus
Partnership Each Year Accumulated Profits Less Taxes)
Taxpayer $ 6,000 $1,000 (year $ 7,986 ($6,000 plus $1,210 less
one); $484 taxes owed plus $2,100 less
$1,100 (year $840 of taxes)
two); $1,210
(year three)
Government $ 4,000 $ 0 (each $ 5,324 ($4,000 plus $484 plus
year) $840 of taxes)
TOTAL $10,000 $3,310 $13,310
The partnership analogy shows the difference between a qualified plan
and a nonqualified plan. In a qualified plan, the government is not allo-
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cated any of the profits of the partnership. All of the profits are allocated
to the taxpayer. The taxpayer leaves the profits in the partnership until
termination of the partnership. At termination, the government finally
taxes the taxpayer's profits of the partnership. In the nonqualified plan,
the government collects its share of the profits each year. The taxpayer
leaves his share of the profits in the partnership until termination of the
partnership. The government taxes the taxpayer's profits of the partner-
ship at termination.
The qualified plan example is also different from the previous situa-
tions that demonstrate the application of the Cary Brown model. For
example, in the case of the immediate deduction of the taxable bond or
an installment sale (with no interest charge), the government is allocated
(step two) and collects its share of the profits of the partnership each year
(step three). But the taxpayer is never taxed on his share of the partner-
ship income (steps four and five never take place). As a result, immedi-
ately deducting the cost of an asset (or deferring the gain on an
installment sale) is equivalent to excluding the future annual return of the
asset from gross income, as described by the Cary Brown model. In the
case of the deductible taxable bond, the asset is the bond and the income
exclusion is the taxpayer's portion of the interest income received each
year on the bond.6' In the case of an installment sale of property with a
zero basis, the asset is the installment obligation and the income exclu-
sion is the taxpayer's portion of the interest income received each year on
the installment obligation.
In the qualified plan example, the government is not allocated any of
the profits of the partnership each year (step two) and consequently does
not collect its share of the profits of the partnership each year (step
three). As a result, steps two and three take place, but the profit sharing
ratio for the taxpayer to government is 100% to 0%. Steps four and five
take place upon termination of the partnership, which does not happen in
the Cary Brown model.
As a result, the qualified plan example is a demonstration that is
equivalent to the Cary Brown model as to the original contribution to the
plan and the return on the original contribution for the first year only. If
the partnership is terminated immediately after one year, the government
will, in substance, collect its share of the profits of the partnership, not
through steps two and three, but rather through steps four and five.
Under the Cary Brown model, the government collects its share of the
profits of the partnership under steps two and three. If the time frame
involved is only one year, then collecting taxes under steps four and five
yields equivalent results to collecting taxes under steps two and three (as-
suming constant tax rates). But after the first year, when the government
does not collect its tax because the partnership does not terminate, a dif-
61. See, e.g., SURREY, supra note 6, at 323 n.6.
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ferent type of tax deferral situation takes place, as illustrated by the quali-
fied plan example.
Under the qualified plan example, it is possible to analyze the alloca-
tion of 100% of the profits of the partnership to the taxpayer as creating
an additional tax deferral situation. In other words, an additional step
one of the partnership analogy takes place once a year is completed. All
of the profits of the partnership of the completed year are allocated to the
taxpayer, and the profits are left in the partnership. This situation is re-
ferred to as the Super Cary Brown model and is demonstrated in the
following tables.
TABLE 9
Termination of the Partnership
After One Year (Return of
Contributions to Income of the Contributions Plus
the Partnership Partnership Accumulated Profits)
Taxpayer $ 6,000 $1,000 $ 6,600 ($6,000 plus $1,000
less $400 of taxes)
Government $ 4,000 $ 0 $ 4,400 ($4,000 plus $400 of
taxes)
TOTAL $10,000 $1,000 $11,000
Table 9 demonstrates the equivalent Cary Brown model as to the origi-
nal contribution of $10,000 to the qualified plan. But as stated earlier, an
additional equivalent Cary Brown type of situation takes place each year
when the government does not tax and collect the profits of the partner-
ship through steps four and five. During the first year, the partnership
generates $1,000 in profits, which is all allocated to the taxpayer (step
two). The government collects no share of the profits (step three). The
government does not collect its $400 tax on the $1,000 of profits from the
first year because it is not allocated any of the profits of the partnership
(steps two and three), the taxpayer does not collect its share of the profits
(step four does not take place), and the partnership does not terminate at
the end of the first year (step five does not take place). By not collecting
the tax on the profits, this is, in essence, an additional capital contribution
to the partnership (or, alternatively, the creation of a second partnership
at the beginning of year two). Therefore, Table 9 is not accurate after the




Contributions to Termination of the Partnership
the Partnership After Two Years (Return of
at the Beginning Income of the Contributions Plus
of Year Two Partnership Accumulated Profits)
Taxpayer $ 6,600 $1,100 $ 7,260 ($6,600 plus $1,100
less taxes owed of $440)
Government $ 4,400 $ 0 $ 4,840 ($4,400 plus $440)
TOTAL $l1,000 $1,100 $12,100
Table 10 demonstrates the equivalent Cary Brown model as to the
$1.1,000 in the qualified plan. Again, an additional equivalent Cary
Brown type of situation takes place each year when the government does
not tax and collect the profits of the partnership through steps four and
five. The partnership generates $1,100 in profits during the second year,
which is all allocated to the taxpayer (step two). The government collects
no share of the profits (step three). The government does not collect its
$440 tax on the $1,100 of profits from the second year because it is not
allocated any of the profits of the partnership (steps two and three), the
taxpayer does not collect his share of the profits (step four does not take
place), and the partnership does not terminate immediately after the sec-
ond year (step five does not take place). Essentially, by not collecting the
tax on the profits, an additional capital contribution to the partnership is
made (or, alternatively, the creation of a additional partnership at the
beginning of year three). Therefore, Table 10 is not accurate after the




Contributions to the Income of the Years (Return of
Partnership at the Partnership Contributions Plus
Beginning of Year Three Each Year Accumulated Profits)
Taxpayer $ 7,260 $1,210 $ 7,986 ($7,260 plus
$1,210 less $484)
Government $ 4,840 $ 0 $ 5,324 ($4,840 plus
$484)
TOTAL $12,100 $1,21.0 $13,310
Table 11 accurately demonstrates the results of a qualified plan if the
distribution to T is made at the end of year three, which is the assumption
in this example. The equivalent Cary Brown model applies to the $12,100
that is in the qualified plan at the beginning of year three. At the end of
year three, the government collects its tax on the profits of the partner-
ship ($484) and also collects its contribution to the partnership because
the partnership is terminating (steps four and five). The taxpayer is allo-
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cated his share of the profits for year three of $1,210 and must pay taxes
of $484 on these profits; contributions of $7,260 are also returned to the
taxpayer. After taxes, the taxpayer is left with a total of $7,986. Year
three, in isolation, is an equivalent example of the Cary Brown model
because the government collects its tax under steps four and five, which is
equivalent to collecting its tax under steps two and three of the Cary
Brown model. In essence, the taxpayer's share of the profits of the part-
nership in year three is never taxed, similar to an installment sale or ex-
pensing of an asset. The combination of all three years together is an
example of the Super Cary Brown model.
VI. UNREALIZED APPRECIATION
A. REALIZATION DOCrRINE-INTRODUCTION
A complicated example of the Cary Brown model involves the realiza-
tion doctrine. Many people may not realize the specific tax deferral that
takes place, at least from a time value of money standpoint, with respect
to unrealized appreciation in property. Assume an individual has $10,000
of after-tax cash to invest. The individual has two investment options.
The first is to invest in an undeveloped vacant piece of land costing
$10,000 (option one). The land is expected to and does increase in value
each year by 10%. The second option is to invest in a fully developed
piece of land that can be rented at 10% of its value each year-1,000
rent each year paid to the owner by the tenant (option two). Assume that
the land in the second option will not increase in value. Also assume
under either option that the taxpayer will sell the land at the end of three
years.
Under option one, at the end of three years, the land will be worth
$13,310 (end of year one-11,000; end of year two-$12,100). If the
land is sold at the end of three years, the gain is $3,310 ($13,310 less
$10,000). The tax at 40% is $1,324 ($3,310 multiplied by 40%). There-
fore, the individual is left with $11,986 after taxes at the end of three
years.
Under option two, at the end of the first year, the taxpayer will still
have land worth $10,000 plus rent of $1,000. The rent is gross income, so
$400 of taxes must be paid at the end of year one. Therefore, the tax-
payer has $10,600 at the end of year one. In year two, the taxpayer re-
ceives another $1,000 of rent and has investment income of $60 from the
rental income earned in year one. In year three, the taxpayer receives
another $1,000 of rent and has investment income of $123.60 from the
rental income earned in years one and two. At the end of year three, the
taxpayer sells the land for $10,000, resulting in no gain or loss. This
leaves the taxpayer with $11,910.16 after taxes. This is less than option
one, even though the taxpayer is in the same economic position at the
end of year three. Under both options, the taxpayer begins with $10,000
cash, earns a 10% pre-tax rate of return each year on his investment, is
subject to a 40% tax rate, invests in land, and closes out the investment at
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the end of three years. The discrepancy in results between the two op-
tions is created by the realization doctrine, which defers taxation until a
realization event takes place. 62
B. USING THE PARTNERSHIP ANALOGY
Can Professor Brown's partnership analogy accurately demonstrate the
realization doctrine in the above example? The answer is "yes," although
the realization doctrine adds an additional layer of complexity to the
partnership model that was not present in the previous situations. The
reason is that additional tax deferral takes place as the property continues
to appreciate in value each year. In other words, the equivalent Cary
Brown model applies to the original unrealized appreciation for the first
year and will continue to apply to it in an additional capacity as long as it
remains and is untaxed. But the equivalent Cary Brown model will also
apply in an additional capacity as the property continues to appreciate in
value. This continuous additional application of the equivalent Cary
Brown model will occur as the property increases in value from year to
year.
Returning to the appreciated property example, at the end of the first
year, the land has appreciated in value to $11,000. At this point, tax
deferral takes place. The appreciation of $1,000 in essence creates a part-
nership between the taxpayer and the government, with the taxpayer con-
tributing $600 and the government contributing $400 (step one). During
the second year, the partnership generates $100 of investment income
($1,000 of appreciation multiplied by 10% rate of return), which is allo-
cated entirely to the taxpayer because, under the realization doctrine, the
government does not tax mere appreciation in property (step two). The
government does not collect its $40 tax on the $100 of profits from the
second year because it is not allocated any of the profits of the partner-
ship (steps two and three). Further, the taxpayer does not collect his
share of the profits (step four does not take place), and the partnership
does not terminate immediately after the second year (step five does not
take place).
By not collecting the tax on the profits, the government has done noth-
ing to prevent tax deferral in year two. Also, during the second year, the
land appreciates another $1,000. This is, in essence, an additional contri-
bution of $600 by the taxpayer to the partnership and an additional con-
62. See, e.g., David P. Hariton, The Accrual of Interest on Derivative Investments:
Where Do We Go From Here?, 74 TAXES 1011, 1012 (1996) ("[S]o long as we continue
under a realization system of tax accounting, it is not possible to achieve an equivalent tax
treatment of economically equivalent financial investments."); David S. Miller, Taxpayers'
Ability to Avoid Tax Ownership: Current Law and Future Prospects, 51 TAX LAW. 279, 333
(1998) ("Some argue that deferral through nonownership is a natural consequence of our
realization-based tax system, and entirely consistent with the indefinite deferral enjoyed by
owners of appreciated real estate and stock of corporations that never declare a dividend,
such as Microsoft."); Schenk, supra note 2, at 631-35 (stating that once the realization prin-
ciple is adopted, the tax burden is distributed unequally).
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tribution of $400 by the government to the partnership (a new step one
takes place), bringing their total contributions to $1,200 and $800,
respectively.
The taxpayer sells the property at the end of year three for $13,310.
During year three, the partnership generates $210 of investment income,
which is allocated entirely to the taxpayer because the government does
not tax mere appreciation in property (step two). The government col-
lects its $124 tax on the $310 of profits from the second and third years
even though it was not allocated any of the profits of the partnership
(steps two and three), but rather because the partnership terminated at
the end of the third year (steps four and five take place). Also, during the
third year, the land appreciates another $1,000. Again, this is, in essence,
an additional contribution of $600 by the taxpayer to the partnership and
an additional contribution of $400 by the government to the partnership
(a new step one takes place), bringing their total contributions to $1,800
and $1,200, respectively.
Because the land is sold for $13,310 at the end of year three, the part-
nership is terminated, and the taxpayer receives $10,000 as a return of
basis. The taxpayer also receives $1,800 as a return of his contribution to
the partnership, plus $310 as his share of the profits of the partnership,
less the taxes of $124 owed to the government. The government receives
$1,200 as a return of its contribution to the partnership, plus $124 as its
tax on the profits of the partnership. The taxpayer receives a total of
$11,986, and the government receives a total of $1,324.
TABLE 12
Contributions to Income for the Income for the Termination of
the Partnership Second Year Third Year the Partnership
Taxpayer $ 600 $100 $210 $1,986 ($1,800
plus $ 600 plus $310 less
plus $ 600 $124 taxes)
Government $ 400 $ 0 $ 0 $1,324 ($1,200
plus $ 400 plus $124)
plus $ 400
TOTAL $3,000 $100 $210 $3,310
C. COMPARISON OF UNREALIZED APPRECIATION TO
QUALIFIED PLANS
It should be apparent that unrealized appreciation (when isolated from
the after-tax investment in the underlying property) is an example of the
Super Cary Brown model. As demonstrated, qualified plans are also an
example of the Super Cary Brown model. As a result, assuming stable tax
rates with no preferential treatment for capital gains, no fair market value
basis at death rules, and stable investment yields, unrealized appreciation is
equivalent to having a corresponding amount set aside in a qualified plan.
In other words, from a tax deferral standpoint and using the assumptions
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previously stated, a taxpayer would be indifferent between having prop-
erty with unrealized appreciation of, for example, $1,000 and having
$1,000 set aside in a qualified plan.
An example will demonstrate the equivalence of unrealized apprecia-
tion and funds set aside in a qualified plan. Assume individual T receives
$30,000 salary from her employer. T contributes $1,000 to a qualified
plan. The qualified plan could be a traditional individual retirement ac-
count (IRA) 63 or a qualified cash or deferred arrangement plan (CODA
or 401(k)).64 The end result is that T will only have $29,000 of taxable
income for the year. The $1,000 contributed to the qualified plan is either
deducted from gross income (as with an IRA plan) 65 or excluded from
gross income (as with a 401(k) plan).66 In other words, the money in the
qualified plan is comprised of pre-tax dollars. The $1,000 in the qualified
plan will grow to $1,100 at the end of one year; $1,210 at the end of two
years; $1,331 at the end of three years; and so on. It will continue to grow
at a 10% pre-tax rate of return each year. At the end of x years, the fund
will have $1,000(1 + r)'. When the money is distributed to T from the
qualified plan, T will receive 60% of the total funds, and the government
will receive 40% based on the application of the partnership analogy to
the Super Cary Brown model.
Assume individual A receives $29,000 in salary from his employer. A
also owns undeveloped land. During the current year, the land has ap-
preciated $1,000 in value. A will only include $29,000 in gross income.
The $1,000 of appreciation is not taxed because of the realization doc-
trine.67 In other words, the portion of the property that represents the
unrealized appreciation can be likened to $1,000 of pre-tax dollars. This
is, in some sense, similar to A receiving a $30,000 salary but using $1,000
of the salary to buy property for which the government allows an immedi-
ate deduction. If this were the case, A would have taxable income of
$29,000 and own property with a value of $1,000 and a basis of zero. In
other words, A owns property with an unrealized appreciation of $1,000.
This unrealized appreciation will increase to $1,100 at the end of one
year; $1,210 at the end of two years; $1,331 at the end of three years; and
so on. It will continue to grow at a 10% pre-tax rate of return each year.
At the end of x years, the amount of unrealized appreciation will be
$1.,000(1 + r)'. When A receives the money from this unrealized appreci-
ation (by selling or otherwise disposing of the property in a taxable
event), A will receive 60% of the total funds and the government will
receive 40% based on the application of the partnership analogy to the
Super Cary Brown model. Unrealized appreciation of $1,000 is
equivalent to $1,000 set aside in a qualified plan.
63. See I.R.C. § 408 (West Supp. 1998).
64. See I.R.C. § 401(k).
65. See I.R.C. § 219.
66. See I.R.C. § 401(k).
67. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
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Of course, the funding of qualified plans and unrealized appreciation is
completely different. A qualified plan is almost always funded with pre-
tax dollars, whereas unrealized appreciation in property is, in almost all
cases, achieved by using after-tax dollars.68 But once the unrealized ap-
preciation is generated, whether expected or not, then it is equivalent to
funds set aside in a qualified plan.
In fact, it may be appropriate to isolate unrealized appreciation from
the after-tax dollars used to purchase the underlying property for several
reasons. When property is bought using after-tax dollars, tax deferral has
not yet taken place. Once the property appreciates in value, then tax
deferral takes place. In other words, the partnership between the tax-
payer and the government is created once appreciation occurs. It is at
this point (when appreciation occurs) that an analysis of the tax deferral
benefit should be made and appropriate action, if any, should be taken to
prevent deferral.
In addition, in terms of attacking tax deferral, the after-tax dollars in-
vested in the appreciated property, in certain instances, may not be par-
ticularly relevant. For example, probably the most-discussed method for
eliminating deferral with respect to unrealized appreciation is a mark-to-
market approach. Under a mark-to-market approach, the after-tax in-
vestment in the property is ignored except for determining the beginning
and ending bases of the property. Assume a taxpayer owns land that has
appreciated $1,000 during the year. Under a mark-to-market approach,
the $1,000 would be included in the taxpayer's gross income. It does not
matter whether the taxpayer paid $10,000 or $1 million for the land. The
end result is that $1,000 is included in the taxpayer's gross income, and
the basis in the property (whatever it may be) is increased by $1,000.
It seems particularly appropriate to focus solely on the unrealized ap-
preciation and ignore the after-tax dollars used to purchase the underly-
ing property if the unrealized appreciation was due to labor or luck and
not to a predictable rate of return.69 For example, assume T owns land
long thought essentially worthless, which has a negligible basis. A valua-
ble mineral deposit is found nearby, immediately causing the value of T's
land to rise to $10,000. The appreciation of the land to $10,000 is
equivalent to having $10,000 set aside in a qualified plan. They are both
68. It is possible that unrealized appreciation in property could be generated by pre-
tax dollars. For example, section 179 allows an immediate deduction for certain types of
personal depreciable property purchased for use in a trade or business. See I.R.C. § 179.
But this type of property almost always depreciates in value and is purchased for the in-
creased income stream it will generate for the business.
69. See, e.g., William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Distributional Implications of
Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax, in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 11, 1, 6-
7 (James M. Poterba ed., 1997) (inframarginal returns are returns associated with rents to
ideas, managerial skill, or market power); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income
Taxed Under an Income Tax is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REV. 1, 6
(1996) (distinguishing increased wealth arising from brilliance, hard work, and luck from
above-normal return to capital investment); Cunningham, supra note 6, at 23 (arguing




examples of the Super Cary Brown model. Assume the land's value con-
tinues to rise by 10% annually for three years. At the end of three years,
T sells the land (still undeveloped) for $13,310, resulting in $13,310 of
gain. T will have $7,986 remaining after taxes, just as if T had set aside
$10,000 in a qualified plan for three years. If T receives preferential capi-
tal gains treatment on sale of the land,7) or dies and the property's basis is
stepped up to fair market value,71 the benefit of the unrealized apprecia-
tion can become greater than having a corresponding amount set aside in
a qualified plan. 72
D. ATFACKING TAX DEFERRAL ON UNREALIZED APPRECIATION
One of the most discussed methods for eliminating tax deferral with
respect to unrealized appreciation is the mark-to-market approach.73
Under mark-to-market, 74 no partnership is ever created between the tax-
payer and the government. In other words, step one of the partnership
analogy never takes place. This is due to the fact that at the time the
partnership would be created, the basis of the property is marked to fair
market value, eliminating any gain in the property and thereby also elimi-
70. See I.R.C. §§ 1221 (West Supp. 1998), 1222, and 1(h).
71. I.R.C. § 1014.
72. See, e.g., Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, The Effects of Fundamental Tax Re-
form on Saving, in ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 83, 87 (Henry J.
Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996) (discussing the fact that assets that result in capital
gains can sometimes provide more favorable tax advantages than assets held in retirement
plans due to preferential tax treatment for capital gains and fair market value basis at
death rules for capital assets).
73. There are other methods of eliminating tax deferral created by the realization doc-
trine. See, e.g., Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AMER. ECON.
REV. 167 (1991) (discussing a proposal to charge interest on the tax deferred at the risk-
free rate of return and to treat each asset as appreciating at the risk-free rate); David F.
Bradford, Fixing Realization Accounting: Symmetry, Consistency and Correctness in the
Taxation of Financial Instruments, 50 TAx L. REV. 731 (1995) (proposing a risk-free rate of
return on property but also establishing a gain reference date at the time the investment is
made and using that date to compute any interest charge); Noel B. Cunningham &
Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A "Revolutionary" Approach to Owner-
ship, 47 TAx L. REV. 725 (1992) (proposing a guide-line rate of return using the risk-free
rate of return to the taxpayer's basis in the property interest); Mary L. Fellows, A Compre-
hensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 88 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1990) (proposing an interest charge
for the period that the tax on appreciation is deferred, generally referred to as retrospec-
tive taxation); Mark P. Gergen, The Effects of Price Volatility and Strategic Trading Under
Realization, Expected Return and Retrospective Taxation, 49 TAx L. REV. 209 (1994) (dis-
cussing mark-to-market, retrospective taxation, and expected return taxation). In part to
avoid the problems created by the realization doctrine, Professor Andrews has favored a
consumption-based tax. See Andrews, supra note 5; see also William D. Andrews, Fairness
and the Choice Between a Consumption-Type and an Accretion-Type Personal Income Tax:
A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1975); Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and
the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961 (1992); Graetz, supra note 9; Alvin C. Warren,
Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV.
931 (1975); Alvin C. Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?,
89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980).
74. For purposes of this Article, the term "mark-to-market" is used interchangeably
with the terms "accrual taxation" and "accretion taxation."
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nating any tax deferral.7 5
A mark-to-market regime has been discussed by a number of commen-
tators. 76 Most agree that it is a theoretically correct approach in an ideal
income tax system. In other words, it implements the Haig-Simons defi-
nition of income, which is considered the ideal definition of income by
most tax theorists. 77 Under the Haig-Simons definition, income is de-
fined as the "algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property
rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. s78 As
many commentators have noted, however, eliminating the realization re-
quirement and adopting a mark-to-market approach for unrealized ap-
preciation in property could lead to numerous problems. 79 These
problems include liquidity in paying the resulting income tax, the admin-
istrative difficulty of determining the changes in fair market value of the
taxpayer's assets (particularly those not traded on a publicly-traded ex-
change), and possible constitutional (or political) problems.8 1 However,
75. The assumption being made here is that the property will be marked-to-market on
the last day of the taxpayer's taxable year and that any increase or decrease during the
course of the year is ignored until the last day. As a result, the assumption is that no tax
deferral takes place during the course of the year even though the property may have
appreciated in value. Tax deferral is treated as taking place on the last day of the year
when the amount of appreciation (if any) is calculated. See, e.g., Jeff Strnad, Periodicity
and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817 (1990) (discussing
continuous accretion taxation); Land, supra note 1, at 73-75 (suggesting tax deferral cre-
ated by the realization requirement should be addressed by continuous accretion taxation).
76. The recent literature on mark-to-market, accrual taxation, and accretion taxation
is quite voluminous. See, e.g., Fred B. Brown, "Complete" Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN Di-
EGO L. REV. 1559 (1996); Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 73; Joseph M. Dodge, A
Combined Mark-to-Market and Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal,
50 TAX L. REV. 265 (1995); Thomas L. Evans, The Evolution of Federal Income Tax Ac-
counting-A Growing Trend Towards Mark-to-Market?, 67 TAXES 824 (1989); Fellows,
supra note 6; Gergen, supra note 73; Daniel I. Halperin, Saving the Income Tax: An
Agenda for Research, 77 TAX NOTES 967 (1997); Edward D. Kleinbard & Thomas L. Ev-
ans, The Role of Mark-to-Market Accounting in a Realization-Based Tax System, 75 TAXES
788 (1997); David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxa-
tion, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986); Theodore S. Sims, Long-Term Debt, the Term Struc-
ture of Interest and the Case for Accrual Taxation, 47 TAX L. REV. 313 (1992); Jeff Strnad,
The Taxation of Bonds: The Tax Trading Dimension, 81 VA. L. REV. 47 (1995); Strnad,
supra note 75, at 1817; Patricia D. White, Realization, Recognition, Reconciliation, Ration-
ality and the Structure of the Federal Income Tax System, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2034 (1990);
Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the Vir-
tue of Attainable Values, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (1997).
77. See Robert M. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in
THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921) reprinted in AMER. ECON.
ASSN., READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54, 55 (Richard A. Musgrave & Carl
S. Shoup eds., 1959); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
78. SIMONS, supra note 77, at 50.
79. See, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD AND THE U. S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF,
BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (2d ed. 1984); GEORGE F. BREAK & JOSEPH A.
PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM: THE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM? (1975); Boris I. Bittker, A
"Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967);
Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1974).
80. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy,
107 HARV. L. REV. 460, 462 (1993); Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 73, at 741 (arguing
that constitutionality should not be a problem in adopting a mark-to-market regime, based
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because unrealized appreciation is equivalent to having a corresponding
amount of funds set aside in a qualified plan, it appears that a strong
argument can be made to partially or completely repeal the realization
doctrine, at least as to publicly-traded property where problems of liquid-
ity and valuation generally are not present.8'
E. ANOTHER VIEW OF THE REALIZATION DOCTRINE
1. Introduction
Rather than focusing solely on the unrealized appreciation component
of property, it is possible to focus on the entire piece of property and
analyze it under tax deferral principles. Assume T has $10,000 of salary
that T includes in gross income. T invests the after-tax proceeds of $6,000
in property that will appreciate in value by 10% each year. Assume at
the end of three years, T dies and the property receives a fair market
value basis at death equaling $7,986 ($6,000 multiplied by (1.10)'). The
recipient of T's property can dispose of it for its fair market value of
$7,986 with no income tax liability. This is in many ways an equivalent
result to investing the entire salary in a qualified plan for three years.82
As shown earlier, the qualified plan is an example of the Super Cary
Brown model. Property with unrealized appreciation (focusing on the
entire property, including the after-tax dollars used to purchase the prop-
erty as well as the unrealized appreciation), in which section 1014 is uti-
lized, is really an application of the Super Cary Brown model, or more
specifically, a kind of reverse Super Cary Brown.
The reverse Super Cary Brown is a situation where no partnership is
created, but the investment income is excluded from gross income. In
addition, the investment income generated by the previous year's invest-
ment income is also excluded from gross income. As shown above, an
example is appreciated property to which section 1014 applies. Another
example is the Roth IRA created by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.83
Under the Roth IRA, no partnership is created between the taxpayer and
the government because the initial investment is not deductible. 84 In
other words, the Roth IRA is funded with after-tax dollars. Each year
the investment income is solely that of the taxpayer and not the govern-
ment. When the Roth IRA is terminated, the taxpayer collects the entire
amount, as it is free of income taxes. 85
in part on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Murphy v. United States, 992 F.2d 929 (9th Cir.
1993)).Congress has adopted mark-to-market in several areas of the Internal Revenue
Code. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 475 (West Supp. 1998) (dealers and traders in securities and
commodities); 817 and 817A (certain life insurance contracts); 1256 (regulated futures con-
tracts); 1296 (marketable stock in a passive foreign investment company).
81. See Halperin, supra note 76, at 971 (arguing that mark-to-market should be
adopted for all publicly-traded instruments and contractual arrangements on which the
payments are dependent on the value of publicly-traded instruments).
82. Of course, T has to die to get this equivalent result.
83. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 302(a), 111 Stat. 825 (1997).
84. See I.R.C. § 408A(c)(1).
85. See I.R.C. § 408A(d)(1).
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2. Combining the Two Views on Realization
It is possible to combine the views of focusing solely on unrealized ap-
preciation (ignoring the actual investment) under the Super Cary Brown
model and also focusing on the entire appreciated property (including the
actual investment) under a reverse Super Cary Brown analysis. Assume
a brilliant inventor, who is also an entrepreneur, makes an important
technological discovery that is marketed by the inventor's own com-
pany.8 6 The inventor established the company ten years ago by contrib-
uting $5,000 for all of the stock of the company. As a result of the
brilliant discovery, the inventor's stock is now worth $1 million. Assume
also that comparable investments during this ten-year time frame yielded
an annual rate of return of 10%.87
At a 10% rate of return, $5,000 invested for ten years will grow to
$12,968.71.88 It may make sense to bifurcate the value of the stock-
focus on the investment growing from $5,000 to nearly $13,000 by looking
at the entire investment and treating the remaining value of the stock
($987,000) under the Super Cary Brown analysis, in which $987,000 is
likened to a corresponding amount set aside in a qualified plan.89 In
other words, the $5,000 investment is treated as creating an asset now
worth $13,000. The remaining $987,000 is treated separately, as it was
arguably created by brilliance, hard work, and luck, not by the $5,000
investment.90
86. See Warren, supra note 69, at 4-5; Cunningham, supra note 6, at 23-24.
87. Using a rate of return based on what similar investments have generated is obvi-
ously subject to interpretation in terms of what are similar investments. But the idea is to
break the unrealized appreciation into four components: (1) risk-free rate of return on the
after-tax investment, (2) risk premium on the after-tax investment, (3) inflation premium
on the after-tax investment, and (4) inframarginal return. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra
note 6, at 23 (describing capital income as composed of three components: the risk-free
rate of return, the risk premium, and the inframarginal return, but not the inflation pre-
mium in a normative income tax and noting that inframarginal return may not be a return
on capital but rather a return to labor or an investor's luck or ingenuity); Warren, supra
note 69, at 5 ("[S]ome gains that at first might appear to be inframarginal returns to capital
are actually returns to labor or, more particularly, to entrepreneurship."). The first three
components would be subject to the reverse Super Cary Brown approach on the entire
property, and the fourth component would be isolated from the underlying property and
analyzed under the Super Cary Brown model.
88. $5,000 multiplied by (1 + .10)1".
89. Bifurcation in the case of financial instruments (dividing a financial instrument
into a collection of component instruments and taxing each according to its economic sub-
stance) has been suggested as one possible solution in taxing the wide array of financial
instruments. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(g), 56 Fed. Reg. 8308 (1991); withdrawn, 59
Fed. Reg. 64884 (1994); see also David P. Hariton, New Rules Bifurcating Contingent Debt
- A Mistake?, 51 TAX NOTES 235 (1991) (opposing bifurcation because of its inability to
account for contingent payment obligations); Lawrence Lokken, New Rules Bifurcating
Contingent Debt - A Good Start, 51 TAX NOTES 495 (1991) (supporting bifurcation but
admitting that it is not a perfect approach); Weisbach, supra note 2, at 511 (bifurcation is
the best approach to taxing financial instruments); Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial Prod-
ucts in a Second-Best World: Bifurcation and Integration, 50 TAX L. REV. 545 (1994).
90. See Warren, supra note 69, at 5-6; see also Gentry & Hubbard, supra note 69, at 2-
6; Cunningham, supra note 6, at 23.
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Under this bifurcated view, it may make sense to allow $8,000 of the
gain ($13,000 minus $5,000) to potentially escape tax under section 1014
when the investor dies because that would be no better than having
$5,000 set aside initially in a qualified plan, such as a Roth IRA, earning
an annual 10% rate of return. But, under this bifurcated view of the
property, it appears to be overly beneficial to allow the $987,000 to es-
cape tax under section 1014. It may also be overly beneficial to give pref-
erential tax treatment to the $987,000 in the form of capital gains if the
investor sells the stock. As stated earlier, the unrealized appreciation of
$987,000 can be likened to having a corresponding amount set aside in a
qualified plan, such as a traditional IRA or a 401(k) plan, which is already
a tremendous tax benefit, one that usually requires that a number of very
rigid requirements be met.
F. EXTENSION OF THE REALIZATION DOCTRINE
The realization doctrine can be used in an almost infinite number of
similar situations. For example, compare the difference between invest-
ing in stock of a growth company that pays no dividends versus investing
in stock of a mature company that pays out all earnings by way of divi-
dends. The investment of stock in a growth company will not be taxed
until a realization event takes place, such as a sale. The dividends from
ownership of stock in a mature company will be taxed each year as the
dividends are received.
The realization doctrine also creates tremendous problems in taxing
financial instruments and derivatives. A leading commentator on deriva-
tives has written that because of the realization doctrine, it is not possible
to achieve an equivalent tax treatment of economically equivalent finan-
cial investments.91 This is because of the tax deferral that results from
the realization doctrine. Professor Andrews wrote a number of years ago
that the realization doctrine is the "Achilles' heel of the income tax"-
referring, in large part, to the tax deferral that takes place. 92 The benefit
of the tax deferral is explained by the Super Cary Brown model. The tax
deferral benefit of unrealized appreciation is equivalent to a correspond-
ing amount set aside in a qualified plan. As a result, the taxation of finan-
cial instruments and derivatives involves issues of tax deferral, which I
believe Professor Brown identified fifty years ago.
91. See Hariton, supra note 62, at 1012 ("[S]o long as we continue under a realization
system of tax accounting, it is not possible to achieve an equivalent tax treatment of eco-
nomically equivalent financial investments."); see also Reed Shuldiner, A General Ap-
proach to the T7xation of Financial Instruments, 71 TEX. L. REV. 243, 246 (1992) ("Most, if
not all, of these problems [shortcomings in the present tax treatment of financial instru-
ments] could be solved by abandoning our current realization system and adopting mark-
to-market accounting for financial instruments."); Peter C. Canellos, Commentary, 50 TAX
L. REV. 829, 829 (1995) ("It is impossible to erect a sound structure on the flawed founda-
tion represented by the realization requirement, which, as has been noted so often, has
little to do with the proper measurement of economic income.").
92. Andrews, supra note 1, at 280 ("But unrealized appreciation has proved, in fact, to
be the Achilles' heel of the whole comprehensive income tax ideal.").
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VII. FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE CARY BROWN MODEL AND
THE SUPER CARY BROWN MODEL
The Cary Brown model and the Super Cary Brown model can easily be
described by the five-step partnership analogy used throughout this Arti-
cle. Under the Cary Brown model, steps one, two, and three take place
but steps four and five do not. Under the Super Cary Brown model, steps
one, four, and five take place. To eliminate tax deferral, steps four and
five must be analyzed in the Cary Brown situation and steps two and
three must be analyzed in the Super Cary Brown situation.
As a result, one can easily see that in eliminating tax deferral, first it is
important to determine whether the Cary Brown model or the Super
Cary Brown model is applicable. Once this determination is made, ap-
propriate measures can be taken to combat deferral. For example, as-
sume an installment sale has taken place. As demonstrated earlier,
installment sales are an example of the Cary Brown model. As a result,
steps one, two, and three of the partnership analogy take place. The gov-
ernment needs to focus on steps four and five to eliminate tax deferral. It
generally does not matter what method is adopted to eliminate deferral,
as long as it is consistent with steps four and five.
Assume instead that the government wants to take a serious look at
eliminating the tax deferral benefit of unrealized appreciation. As
demonstrated earlier, unrealized appreciation is an example of the Super
Cary Brown model. As a result, step one of the partnership analogy
takes place. The government needs to focus on steps two and three to
eliminate tax deferral. Again, it generally does not matter what method
is adopted to eliminate deferral as long as it is consistent with steps two
and three.
The following table summarizes this.
TABLE 13
Steps in the Steps in the
Partnership Analogy Partnership Analogy
That Take Place That Are Lacking Examples
Cary Brown 1-Deferral takes 4-Government Expensing, Install-
Model place; taxes the taxpayer's ment sales (with no
2-Allocate the share of the profits interest charge)
profits of the part- either at the time of
nership based on the allocation or on col-
tax rate on invest- lection;
ment income; 5-When tax defer-
3-The government ral period ends, gov-
collects its share of ernment taxes the
the profits taxpayer's share of






Steps in the Partner- Steps in the Partner-
ship Analogy That ship Analogy That
Take Place Are Lacking Examples
Super Cary 1-Deferral takes 2-Allocate the Qualified Plans,
Brown Model place; profits of the part- Unrealized apprecia-
4-Government nership based on the tion in property
taxes the taxpayer's tax rate on invest-
share of the profits ment income;
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There have been a number of brilliant observations on tax deferral
made in the last twenty-five years. Much of the credit goes to scholars
such as Professors Surrey and Andrews, who originally created awareness
of the Cary Brown model. They and subsequent scholars have advanced
the discussion of tax deferral to an unbelievably high level. But it seems
that if one goes back fifty years, to 1948, Professor Cary Brown's contri-
bution to tax deferral is really the fountainhead of all learning on the
subject. While a number of scholars have picked up on the Cary Brown
model, it is unfortunate that Professor Brown's partnership analogy in
describing tax deferral has not been more widely discussed. Once under-
stood, it can be used to describe tax deferral and also used to demon-
strate how to properly eliminate the time value of money benefit of tax
deferral. Most importantly, the partnership aspect of the Cary Brown
model appears to be a unifying theme in describing most, if not all, tax
deferral situations.
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